Chapter
Twenty-Three
National
media attention; the cost of a scandal
The different athletic/academic scandals at UNC had
caused small national ripples at times over the previous three years, but never
had any truly moved to the forefront of the national media. That finally showed signs of changing,
however. The New York Times published an article on the scandal that appeared
online late on December 31, 2013, and then in print on New Year’s Day. BusinessWeek
followed with a series of articles that began on January 2. There was an in-depth CNN report by Sara Ganim on January 7. Incidentally, Ganim was the reporter who had
uncovered many key details during the early stages of the Penn State case
involving Jerry Sandusky. The New York Post contributed a piece on
January 11, and then a crippling episode of ESPN’s
investigative show “Outside the Lines” aired on January 14, 2014, blatantly calling
out UNC for the apparent fraud that benefitted athletes, and the NCAA for
refusing to take any action.
The implications of so much attention from national media
sources meant that it might be extremely difficult for the NCAA to ignore the
issues going forward. Why that had even transpired
for so long was truly a mystery, especially when considering past similar
cases. Several years earlier the NCAA
had ruled that Florida State had been guilty of major violations in a
widespread academic fraud case from 2006 and 2007. An online music class was apparently taught
irregularly, a former learning specialist had typed portions of papers for
three student-athletes, and answers were provided to an athlete for an online
psychology course. The case involved 61
athletes, all of whose individual records were eventually expunged. Furthermore, a total of 12 wins by the
school’s football team were retroactively erased by the NCAA for the use of
ineligible players. The number of
classes and affected student-athletes in FSU’s case paled in comparison to the
AFAM fraud at UNC.
At the University of Georgia in 2003 a former player –
Tony Cole – claimed that an assistant coach had paid some of his bills, done
schoolwork for him, and taught a sham class on coaching. Cole said he never attended the class, but
along with two other basketball players received an A. That seemed extremely similar to the AFAM
scandal, except for the fact that it was only one class and three student-athletes
at Georgia – compared to hundreds of courses and student-athletes at UNC. The Georgia basketball program self-banned
itself from the 2003 postseason, but then the NCAA added further
penalties: the loss of future
scholarships, the vacating of numerous wins over a three-year period, and the
expunging of players’ records.
A scandal surfaced at the University of Minnesota in
early 1999. A former basketball office
manager said she had written papers for at least 20 men’s basketball players
over a period of several years. Two days
after the story first ran, the NCAA suspended four current players. Following a full investigation a number of
violations were uncovered, and the school was ultimately stripped of all
postseason awards, titles, personal records, and statistics dating back to the
1993-94 season. Later, the Big Ten
conference vacated the school’s 1997 conference title, and the school also
returned 90% of the profits earned by the team during various appearances in
the NCAA tournament. There were stark
similarities between Minnesota’s and UNC’s cases. But once again, the situation in Chapel Hill
appeared to dwarf what had happened at the other school. If the same scrutiny were given to UNC as to
Minnesota (a full-fledged, external investigation), the vacated results and
titles would be much greater.
*
* *
Often over the past several years fans of UNC had
complained that the media and other factions were “out to get” the school, and
were determined to have the basketball national championship banners
removed. What those individuals likely
did not realize was that the basketball team was a massive part of the school’s
image, and people often associated the success of those year-to-year teams with
their overall perception of the university.
In essence, when the team did well, in various areas the school also did
well. For example, a March 19, 2009,
article on wral.com was titled “Heels
merchandise head and shoulders above rest.”
The article stated that the Tar Heel brand name was a money-maker, and
had generated $25.9 million for the university, according to a then-recent
analysis by Forbes magazine. Those sales had made UNC the most valuable
men’s basketball program in the country.
As a result, it became clear that UNC and its leaders likely weren’t
just trying to protect the banners that hung in the rafters of the Dean Smith
Center, but also the revenue that poured in due to those teams’ successes.
Retailers in Chapel Hill spoke to wral.com about the ease of selling UNC-branded clothing, mugs, and
other items. “I told somebody the other
day there’s only four things that people need.
That’s food, gas, shelter and Carolina souvenirs, and we happen to be in
the latter part of that, so we’re very fortunate,” said Genny Wrenn, manager of a store on Franklin Street. Carolina Brewery manager Thomas Transue said
his restaurant was usually packed during the NCAA Tournament, especially when
UNC was playing. “There is such a strong background. We’ve had folks coming in for years for the
Tar Heels,” he said.
There were other measurable benefits to having a
basketball program that accomplished great feats. Based on a December 19, 2012, article in the News and Observer, the prior year’s
profit from the school’s basketball team had been $16.9 million. It had also ranked number one in a recent ESPN assessment of top 50 college
basketball programs based on wins, championships, and lack of NCAA
sanctions. During the 2012 fiscal year,
donations to the school’s Ram’s Club, which funded student-athlete scholarships
and capital projects, had increased to $33 million.
The positive effects of a strong public perception could
spread to other areas of the university, as well. Statistics had long shown that freshman
applications to a school often increased following a sports championship – of which
UNC had won three since 1992. Based on
data from the school’s own uncnews.unc.edu
site, the application rate continued to climb.
The site reported that in the fall of 2013 the university enrolled
nearly 4,000 first-year students from a record 30,836 applications. Furthermore, the school was 9th
among leading private and public research universities for the level of federal
funding devoted to research and development in all fields. It was also among the top 100 U.S. colleges
and universities awarding undergraduate degrees to minority students, according
to a 2011 issue of the magazine Diverse:
Issues in Higher Education. The
school ranked 2nd for graduating African-American students majoring
in area, ethnic, cultural, gender, and group studies. Unfortunately, that last statistic might be
viewed in a somewhat critical light going forward due to the extensive AFAM
scandal.
How many of those donations, applications, honors and
awards were connected to an image carved at least in part by athletes and their
successes? That would be a matter of
opinion, obviously, unless one could find specific quotes from people who
stated they were influenced by such athletic accomplishments. The fact that UNC men’s basketball
merchandise was the top seller in the entire country, however, spoke to the
mindset of influence and desired conformity.
The fact that UNC sold merchandise, received applications, and were
given grants was not just beneficial to it as a university and brand. It also conversely had a negative effect on
other area schools – schools that were actually doing things the right way,
instead of simply claiming to do so.
Those schools that followed and played by the rules may have lost out on
merchandise sales, and may have lost out on potential applications. And while less likely, it cannot be said for
certain that they didn’t lose out on grants and funding from certain entities,
as well.
*
* *
Based on the numerous instances of public documents
having been withheld, misinformation uncovered, and “no comments” often given,
UNC made a conscious choice as to how to approach its problems over the past
several years. Those choices had come at
a price – both in terms of reputation, but also one of monetary value. Some of the figures have been discussed
earlier in the book, but when looked at as a whole they become even more
daunting. An article appeared on the
online site of Synapse Magazine in
mid-November 2013 which gave an in-depth breakdown of some of the tolls
incurred by UNC over the past three-plus years.
Titled “The Cost of a Scandal,” the piece gathered its
data from both publicly-released information as well as figures provided by the
school itself. The total amount spent
for the academic and athletic portions of the university’s troubles reached
nearly five million dollars. Almost
$500,000 was spent on lawyers during the initial 2010 football revelations and
the first round of academic issues that arose afterwards. That bill was picked up by two funds, the
article reported. About $219,000 came
from the UNC Foundation, a portion of the University’s endowment that drew its
funding entirely from private donations.
Approximately $248,000 of those first legal fees came from the athletic
budget, university spokeswoman Karen Moon said.
The athletic budget typically did not set aside funds for unexpected
expenses (such as legal fees), according to Martina Ballen, chief financial
officer of the school’s athletic department.
She said extra revenue from men’s basketball and football from that year
helped offset the costs.
Other dollar amounts were related to employee
payouts. When Butch Davis’ contract was
terminated by the university, the choice was made to pay him a severance
package of $2.7 million – even though wording in his contract suggested that he
could have been fired with cause and paid nothing. Disgraced assistant coach John Blake
resigned, yet the university paid him $74,500.
Both of those monetary payouts came from the athletic budget.
Next would be the fees for various public relations
experts. Those companies and/or
individuals were hired at the urging of the school’s Board of Trustees and the
UNC System’s Board of Governors. In
former Chancellor Holden Thorp’s own words, “Our board was uneasy about whether
we were doing the best things we could in terms of public relations.” That led to the hiring of at least
three communication experts, with a combined bill of over $530,000. Sallie Shuping-Russell, secretary of the university’s
Board of Trustees, tried to justify the high costs. “It was no longer just about the athletics
program,” she said. “It became about the
integrity of our school. We were dealing
with a level of issues that we didn’t have internal people to sufficiently
handle. It wasn’t like our internal team
was just issuing the news – suddenly, we were the news.” However, the hiring of the public
relations experts didn’t bring about transparency and the truth, but rather a
well-crafted message that was passed off to the public. Many onlookers were intelligent enough to see
the scandalous situations for what they truly were, and thus saw through the PR
attempts.
The infamous Martin investigation cost the school over
one million dollars, much of which was paid to the Baker Tilly firm. Even after spending all of that money for
months of work, the company was still forced to recant one of its most vital
findings when the local News and Observer
newspaper showed it to be false. All
of Baker Tilly’s costs were also financed by the UNC Foundation. All told, about a third of the money spent
during the two scandals came from that Foundation. It was a financial holding tank for the
university that primarily funded scholarships, professorships, and fellowships,
but in times of controversy the Foundation was said to be able to help with the
load. An issue that remained unaddressed
was whether the numerous alumni, outside affiliates, students, and faculty who
had donated money were satisfied knowing that part of their contributions had
gone not towards the advancement of education, but rather to help pay off the
effects (and suspected cover-up) of scandals.
Hodding Carter, a UNC professor of leadership and public
policy, told the magazine that far too often consultants were only hired to
support the position of the administration.
“If you’re going to hire outside anything,” he said, “you better be damn
well sure that those outsiders are ruthless, unyielding in their demand for
information and absolutely committed beyond their paycheck.” Based on how much information on the scandals
those outside entities either missed (or purposely overlooked), it certainly
did not appear that they fit the stringent parameters of which Carter referred.
On the flip side of the coin was Jan Boxill. The faculty chairwoman of the university had
come under heavy fire for her suspected role in tampering with reports in an
effort to dissuade the NCAA from returning to campus. Not surprisingly, she toed the company line
when it came to defending the use of extravagant outside sources, saying that
external consultants were crucial for attempting to keep a unified
faculty. “I think if we had the faculty
running investigations, the situation would have been more contentious and
split,” Boxill said. “It would have
divided the faculty. We wanted to bring
consensus.” To that effect, near-total
consensus was exactly what UNC’s leadership got: other than Mary Willingham and
Professor Jay Smith, virtually every other faculty member refused to speak out
and stand up for what was moral and right.
With regards to the handling of public relations, Stanley
Katz offered a different and more sobering viewpoint. A professor of public and international
affairs at Princeton University, Katz gave his professional opinion that
external help was inexcusable for public relations. “Universities ought to be able to handle
their own public relations,” he said.
“If the university sees the problem as a public relations issue, then it
isn’t internalizing the fact that there is a problem with the way (the
university) handles (itself).”
Former Chancellor Thorp indicated that the current
situation in which the university found itself could have possibly been reached
more cheaply and with less turbulence.
Then, almost as a recurring punch line to an overused joke, he ended the
article with the very same tired PR message that had been rolled out by
university leaders for several years: “But
it was a tough situation, and I think Carolina is in a good position to move
forward.”
*
* *
The essential (and unanswered)
questions:
-- Would the influx of
national attention given to UNC’s scandals finally cause the NCAA to take
appropriate action?
-- Other schools had
been punished by the NCAA for much lesser infractions. Why had they not shown public outrage over
the preferential treatment that UNC seemed to be receiving?
-- How much money had
UNC taken in – from merchandise sales, applications, and other sources – as a
direct or indirect result from athletic successes that had possibly been built
and achieved through fraudulent academic acts?
-- Why weren’t alumni,
outside affiliates, students, and faculty who had donated money to the UNC
Foundation not showing public displeasure at the arguably moral misuse of their
contributions?
